We present Generative Adversarial rePresentations (GAP) as a data-driven framework for learning censored and/or fair representations. GAP leverages recent advancements in adversarial learning to allow a data holder to learn universal representations that decouple a set of sensitive attributes from the rest of the dataset. Under GAP, finding the optimal mechanism? decorrelating encoder/decorrelator is formulated as a constrained minimax game between a data encoder and an adversary. We show that for appropriately chosen adversarial loss functions, GAP provides censoring guarantees against strong information-theoretic adversaries and enforces demographic parity. We also evaluate the performance of GAP on multi-dimensional Gaussian mixture models and real datasets, and show how a designer can certify that representations learned under an adversary with a fixed architecture perform well against more complex adversaries.
Introduction
The use of deep learning algorithms for data analytics has recently seen unprecedented success for a variety of problems such as image classification, natural language processing, and prediction of consumer behavior, electricity use, political preferences, to name a few. The success of these algorithms hinges on the availability of large datasets, that often contain sensitive information, and thus, may facilitate learning models that inherit societal biases leading to unintended algorithmic discrimination on legally protected groups such as race or gender. This, in turn, has led to censoring and fairness concerns and a growing body of research focused on developing representations of the dataset with fairness and/or censoring guarantees. These techniques predominantly involve designing randomizing schemes, and in recent years, distinct approaches with provable statistical censoring or fairness guarantees have emerged.
In the context of censoring, preserving the utility of published datasets while simultaneously providing provable censoring guarantees is a well-known challenge. While context-free censoring solutions, such as differential censoring Dwork et al. [2006b,a] , Dwork [2008] , Dwork and Roth [2014] , provide strong worst-case censoring guarantees, they often lead to a significant reduction in utility. In contrast, context-aware censoring solutions, e.g., mutual information censoring Rebollo-Monedero et al. [2010] , Calmon and Fawaz [2012] , Sankar et al. [2013] , Salamatian et al. [2015] , Basciftci et al. [2016] , achieve improved censoring-utility tradeoff, but assume that the data holder has access to dataset statistics.
In the context of fairness, machine learning models seek to maximize predictive accuracy. Fairness concerns arise when models learned from datasets that include patterns of societal bias and discrimination inherit such biases. Thus, there is a need for actively decorrelating sensitive and non-sensitive data. In the context of publishing datasets or meaningful representations that can be "universally" used for a variety of learning tasks, modifying the training data is the most appropriate and is the focus of this work. Fairness can then be achieved by carefully designing objective functions which approximate a specific fairness definition while simultaneously ensuring maximal utility Zemel et al. [2013] , Calmon et al. [2017] , Ghassami et al. [2018] . This, in turn, requires dataset statistics.
Adversarial learning approaches for context-aware censoring and fairness have been studied extensively Edwards and Storkey [2015] , Abadi and Andersen [2016] , Raval et al. [2017] , Huang et al. [2017] , Tripathy et al. [2017] , Beutel et al. [2017] , Madras et al. [2018] , . They allow the data curator to cleverly decorrelate the sensitive attributes from the rest of the dataset. These approaches overcome the lack of statistical knowledge by taking a data-driven approach that leverages recent advancements in generative adversarial networks (GANs) Goodfellow et al. [2014] , Mirza and Osindero [2014] . However, most existing efforts focus on extensive empirical studies without theoretical verification and focus predominantly on providing guarantees for a specific classification task. This work introduces a general framework for context-aware censoring and fairness that we call generative adversarial representation (GAP) (see Figure 1) . We provide precise connections to information-theoretic censoring and fairness formulations and derive game-theoretically optimal decorrelation schemes to compare against those learned directly from the data. While our framework can be generalized to learn an arbitrary representation using an encoder-decoder structure, this paper primarily focuses on learning private/fair representations of the data (of the same dimension). We list our main contributions below.
1. We introduce GAP, a framework for creating private/fair representations of data using an adversarially trained conditional generative model. Unlike existing works, GAP can exploit different models (e.g., Figure 2 ) to create representations that are useful for a variety of classification tasks, without requiring the designer to model these tasks at training time. We validate this observation via experiments on the GENKI Whitehill and Movellan [2012] , HAR Anguita et al. [2013] and COMPAS ProPublica [2016] datasets using the two GAP architectures presented on the left of Figure 2 . 
Related Work
In the context of publishing datasets with censoring and utility guarantees, a number of similar approaches have been recently considered. We briefly review them and clarify how our work is different. DP-based obfuscators for data publishing have been considered in Hamm [2016] , Liu et al. [2017] . The author in Hamm [2016] considers a deterministic, compressive mapping of the input data with differentially private noise added either before or after the mapping. The approach in Liu et al. [2017] relies on using deep auto-encoders to determine the relevant feature space to add differentially private noise, thereby eliminating the need to add noise to the original data. These novel approaches leverage minimax filters and deep auto-encoders to allow non-malicious entities to learn some public features from the filtered data, while preventing malicious entities from learning other sensitive features. Both approaches incorporate a notion of context-aware censoring and achieve better censoring-utility tradeoffs while using DP to enforce censoring. However, DP can still incur a significant utility loss since it assumes worst-case dataset statistics. Our approach models a rich class of randomization-based schemes via a generative model that allows the generative decorrelator to tailor the noise to the dataset. Our work is closely related to adversarial neural cryptography Abadi and Andersen [2016] , learning censored representations Edwards and Storkey [2015] , censoring preserving image sharing Raval et al. [2017] , censoring-preserving adversarial networks Tripathy et al. [2017] , and adversarially learning fair representation Madras et al. [2018] in which adversarial learning is used to learn how to protect communications by encryption or hide/remove sensitive information or generate fair representation of the data. Similar to these problems, our model includes a minimax formulation and uses adversarial neural networks to learn decorrelation schemes. However, in Edwards and Storkey [2015] , Raval et al. [2017] , Madras et al. [2018] , the authors use non-generative auto-encoders to remove sensitive information. Instead, we use a GANs-like approach to learn decorrelation schemes that prevent an adversary from inferring the sensitive variable. Furthermore, these formulations uses weighted combination of different loss functions to balance censoring with utility. We also go beyond in formulating a game-theoretic setting subject to a distortion constraint. These approaches are not equivalent because of the non-convexity (resp. concavity) of the minimax problem with respect to the decorrelator (resp. adversary) neural network parameters and requires new methods to enforce the distortion constraint during the training process. The distortion constraint allows us to directly limit the amount of distortion added to learn the private/fair representation for a variety of learning tasks, which is crucial for preserving the utility of the learned representation. Moreover, we compare the performance of the decorrelation schemes learned in an adversarial fashion with the gametheoretically optimal ones for canonical synthetic data models thereby providing formal verification of decorrelation schemes that are learned by competing against computational adversaries. Finally, we propose using mutual information as a criterion to certify that the representations we learned adversarially against an attacker with a fixed architecture generalize against unseen attackers with (possibly) more complex architecture.
Fair representations using information-theoretic objective functions and constrained optimization have been proposed in Calmon et al. [2017] , Ghassami et al. [2018] . However, both approaches require the knowledge of dataset statistics, which are very difficult to obtain for real datasets. We overcome the issue of statistical knowledge by taking a data-driven approach, i.e., learning the representation from the data directly via adversarial models. In contrast to in-processing approaches that modify learning algorithms to ensure fair predictions (e..g, using linear programs in Dwork et al. [2012] , Fish et al. [2016] or via adversarial learning approach in Zhang et al. [2018] ), we focus on a pre-processing approach to ensure fairness for a variety of learning tasks.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) have recently received a lot of attention in the machine learning community Goodfellow et al. [2014] , Mirza and Osindero [2014] . Ultimately, deep generative models hold the promise of discovering and efficiently internalizing the statistics of the target signal to be generated. Using GANs to generate synthetic non-sensitive attributes and labels which ensure fairness while preserving the utility of the data (predicting the label) has been studied in Xu et al. [2018] , Sattigeri et al. [2018] . The goal here is to develop a conditional GAN-based model to ensure fairness in the system by learning to generate a fairer synthetic dataset using an unconstrained minimax game with carefully designed loss functions corresponding with both fairness and utility. The synthetic data is generated by a conditional generative adversarial network (GAN) which generates the non-sensitive attributes-label pair given the noise variable and the sensitive attribute. The utility is preserved by generating data that is very similar to the original data. To ensure fairness, the generator generates data samples such that an auxiliary classifier trained to predict the sensitive attribute from the synthetic data performs as poorly as possible. The methods presented in these papers are very different from our method since we are focusing on creating a fair/private representations of the original data while preserving the utility of the representation for a variety of learning tasks. There are different ways for enforcing fairness, and our work presents a framework that aids in achieving this goal. More work is needed to be done in this area.
Outline
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We formally present our GAP model in Section 3. In Section 4, we present results for Gaussian mixture dataset models. Finally, we showcase the performance of GAP on the GENKI, and HAR datasets in Section 5. All proofs and algorithms are deferred to appendices in the accompanying supplementary materials.
Preliminaries
We consider a dataset D with n entries where each entry is denoted as (S, X, Y ) where S ∈ S is a collection of sensitive features, X ∈ X is a collection of non-sensitive features, and Y ∈ Y is the collection of target (non-sensitive) features to be learned. LetŶ ∈ Y be a prediction of Y . We note that S, X, and Y can be a collection of features or labels (e.g., S can be gender, race, and sexual orientation, while Y could be age, facial expression, etc.); for ease of writing, we use the term variable to denote both single and multiple features/labels. Instances of X, S, and Y are denoted by x, s and y, respectively. We assume that each entry (X, S, Y ) is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to P (X, S, Y ).
Recent results on fairness in learning applications guarantees that for a specific target variable, the prediction of a machine learning model is accurate with respect to (w.r.t.) the target variable but unbiased w.r.t. a sensitive variable. The three oft-used fairness measures are demographic parity, equalized odds, and equality of opportunity. Demographic parity imposes the strongest fairness requirement via complete independence of the prediction of the target variable and sensitive variable, and thus, least favors (for correlated target and sensitive variables) utility Hardt et al. [2016] . Equalized odds ensures this independence conditioned on the target variable thereby ensuring equal rates for true and false positives (wherein the target variable is binary) for all demographics. Equal opportunity ensures equalized odds for the true positive case alone Hardt et al. [2016] .
For the sake of completeness, we review these definitions briefly. We note that these definitions are often aimed at sensitive (S) and target (Y ) features that are binary, and in reviewing these definitions below, we make this assumption too. However, we note that these definitions can be generalized to the non-binary setting; indeed, our own generalizations of these definitions as applied to representation setting do not make such an assumption.
Definition 1 (Hardt et al. [2016] ) A predictor f (S, X) =Ŷ satisfies • demographic parity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S, ifŶ and S are independent, i.e., Pr(Ŷ = 1|S = 1) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|S = 0)
(1)
• equalized odds w.r.t. the sensitive variable S and target variable Y , ifŶ and S are independent conditional on Y , i.e.,
• equality of opportunity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S and target variable Y , ifŶ and S are independent conditional on Y = 1, i.e.,
Pr(Ŷ = 1|S = 1, Y = 1) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|S = 0, Y = 1).
We begin by first defining the notions of censoring and fairness for representations. In particular, as discussed thus far, in the censoring context, our goal is to introduce a definition that ensures that the censored representation limits leakage of sensitive variables from adversaries that can potentially learn it from the released data.
Definition 2 (Censored Representations) A representation X r of X is censored w.r.t. the sensitive variable S against a learning adversary h(·), whose performance is evaluated via a loss function (h(X r ), S), if for an optimal adversarial strategy h * = argmin h E[ (h(X r ), S)],
where g(·) is any (randomized) function of X and the expectation is over h, g, X, and S.
To motivate the generation of fair representations, we now extend the definition of demographic parity for representations. Indeed it is known that fair representations can be used to ensure fair classification (see, for example, HARDT BLOG Hardt et al. [2016] ). We formally define fair representation and prove that such representations ensure fair classification.
Definition 3 (Fair Representations) Let X r and S be the supports of X r and S, respectively. A representation X r of X satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. the sensitive variable S if X r and S are independent, i.e., for any x r ∈ X r and s, s ∈ S,
Given this definition, we now prove that a fair representation in the sense of demographic parity will guarantee that any downstream learning algorithm making use of the fair representation is fair (in the sense of demographic parity) w.r.t. the sensitive label S.
Theorem 1 (Fair Learning via Fair Representation) Given a dataset consisting of sensitive, non-sensitive, and target variables (S, X, Y ), respectively, if a fair representation X r = g(X) satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. S, then any learning algorithm f : X r → Y satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. S.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A.
Remark 1 Note that the definitions of equalized odds and equality of opportunity in Def. 1 explicitly involve a downstream learning application, and therefore, the design of a fair representation needs to include a classifier explicitly. In contrast to the universal representation setting considered here, such targeted representations and the ensuing fair classifiers provide guarantees only for those targeted Y features. In this limited context, however, one can still define a representation X r as ensuring equalized odds (w.r.t. to S) in classifying Y if the predicted output learned from X r , i.e.,Ŷ (X r ), is independent of S conditioned on Y .
One simple approach to obtain a fair/censored representation X r is by choosing X r = N where N is a random variable independent of X and S. However, such an X r has no downstream utility (quantified, for example, via downstream task accuracy). More generally, the design of X r has to ensure utility, and thus, there is a tradeoff between guaranteeing fairness/censoring and assuring a desired level of utility. GAP enables quantifying these tradeoffs formally as described in the next section.
Generative Adversarial Representations (GAP) for Censoring/Fairness
Formally, GAP involves two components, an encoder and an adversary as shown in Fig. 1 . The goal of the encoder g : X × S → X r is to actively decorrelate S from X while that of the adversary h : X r → S is to infer S. Thus, in general, g(X, S) is a randomized mapping that outputs a representation X r = g(X, S). Note that the design of g(·) depends on both X and S; however, we note that S may not necessarily be an input to the encoder though it will always affect the design of g(·) via the adversarial training process. In contrast, the role of the adversary is captured via h(X r ), the adversarial decision rule (classifier) in inferring the sensitive variable S asŜ = h(g(X)) from the representation g(X, S). In general, the hypothesis h can be a hard decision rule under which h(g(X)) is a direct estimate of S or a soft decision rule under which h(g(X)) = P h (·|g(X)) is a distribution over S.
To quantify the adversary's performance, we use a loss function (h(g(X = x)), S = s) defined for every pair (x, s). Thus, the adversary's expected loss w.
where the expectation is taken over P (X, S) and the randomness in g and h.
Intuitively, the generative (since it randomizes to decorrelate) encoder would like to minimize the adversary's ability to learn S reliably from X r . This can be trivially achieved by releasing an X r independent of X. However, such an approach provides no utility for data analysts who want to learn non-sensitive variables Y from X r . To overcome this issue, we capture the loss incurred by perturbing the original data via a distortion function d(x r , x), which measures how far the original data X = x is from the processed data X r = x r . Ensuring statistical utility in turn requires constraining the average distortion E[d(g(X), X)] where the expectation is taken over P (X, S) and the randomness in g.
Theoretical Results of GAP
To publish a censored or fair representation X r , the data curator wishes to learn an encoder g that guarantees both censoring/fairness (in the sense that it is difficult for the adversary to learn S from X r ) as well as utility (in the sense that it does not distort the original data too much). In contrast, for a fixed encoder g, the adversary would like to find a (potentially randomized) function h that minimizes its expected loss, which is equivalent to maximizing the negative of the expected loss. This leads to a constrained minimax game between the encoder and the adversary given by
where the constant D ≥ 0 determines the allowable distortion for the generative decorrelator and the expectation is taken over P (X, S) and the randomness in g and h.
Our GAP framework places no restrictions on the adversary. Indeed, different loss functions and decision rules lead to different adversarial models (see Table 1 ). In what follows, we consider a general α-loss function (h(g(X)), s) = α α−1 1 − P h (s|g(X)) 1− 1 α , α > 1 introduced in ?. We show that α-loss can capture various information-theoretic adversaries ranging from a hard-decision adversary under the 0-1 loss function (h(g(X)), s) = I h(g(X)) =s to a soft-decision adversary under the log-loss function (h(g(X)), s) = − log P h (s|g(X)).
Theorem 2 Under α-loss, the optimal adversary decision rule is a 'α-tilted' conditional distribution P * h (s|g(X)) = P (s|g(X)) α s∈S P (s|g(X)) α . The optimization in (6) reduces to min
is the Arimoto conditional entropy.
Under the hard-decision rules in which the adversary uses a 0-1 loss function, the optimal adversarial strategy simplifies to using a MAP decision rule that maximizes P (s|g(X)). For a soft-decision adversary under log-loss, the optimal adversarial strategy h * is P (s|g(X)) and the GAP minimax problem in (6) simplifies to min g(·) I(g(X); S) subject to E[d(g(X), X)] ≤ D, where I(g(X); S) is the mutual information (MI) between g(X) and S.
Corollary 1 Using α-loss, we can obtain a continuous interpolation between a hard-decision adversary under 0-1 loss (α → ∞) and a soft-decision adversary under log-loss function (α → 1).
Loss function (h(g(X)), s)
Optimal adversarial strategy h * Adversary type
Belief refining adversary leads to MI-censoring
Generalized belief refining adversary (6) generates a GAP X r that is censored w.r.t. to S.
Theorem 4 Under log-loss, GAP enforces fairness subject to the distortion constraint. As the distortion increases, the ensuing fairness guarantee approaches ideal demographic parity.
The proofs of Theorem 2 , Corollary 1 and Theorem 4 are presented in Appendix B. Many notions of fairness rely on computing probabilities to ensure independence of sensitive and target variables that are not easy to optimize in a data-driven fashion. In Theorem 4, we propose log-loss (modeled in practice via cross-entropy) in GAP as a proxy for enforcing fairness.
Data-driven GAP
Thus far, we have focused on a setting where the data holder has access to P (X, S). When P (X, S) is known, the data holder can simply solve the constrained minimax optimization problem in (6) (game-theoretic version of GAP) to obtain a decorrelation scheme that would perform best against a chosen type of adversary. In the absence of P (X, S), we propose a data-driven version of GAP that allows the data holder to learn decorrelation schemes directly from a dataset D = {(x (i) , s (i) )} n i=1 . Under the data-driven version of GAP, we represent the decorrelation scheme via a generative model g(X; θ p ) parameterized by θ p . This generative model takes X as input and outputsX. In the training phase, the data holder learns the optimal parameters θ p by competing against a computational adversary: a classifier modeled by a neural network h(g(X; θ p ); θ a ) parameterized by θ a . In the evaluation phase, the performance of the learned decorrelation scheme can be tested under a strong adversary that is computationally unbounded and has access to dataset statistics. We follow this procedure in the next section.
In theory, the functions h and g can be arbitrary. However, in practice, we need to restrict them to a rich hypothesis class. Figure 1 shows an example of the GAP model in which the generative decorrelator and adversary are modeled as deep neural networks. For a fixed h and g, if S is binary, we can quantify the adversary's empirical loss using cross entropy L n (θ p , θ a ) =
. It is easy to generalize cross entropy to the multi-class case using the softmax function. The optimal model parameters are the solutions to
where the expectation is over D and the randomness in g.
The minimax optimization in (7) is a two-player non-cooperative game between the generative decorrelator and the adversary with strategies θ p and θ a , respectively. In practice, we can learn the equilibrium of the game using an iterative algorithm (see Algorithm 1 in Appendix C). We first maximize the negative of the adversary's loss function in the inner loop to compute the parameters of h for a fixed g. Then, we minimize the decorrelator's loss function, which is modeled as the negative of the adversary's loss function, to compute the parameters of g for a fixed h. Observe that the distortion constraint in (7) makes our minimax problem different from what is extensively studied in previous works. To incorporate the distortion constraint, we use the penalty method Lillo et al. [1993] to replace the constrained optimization problem by adding a penalty to the objective function. The penalty consists of a penalty parameter ρ t multiplied by a measure of violation of the constraint at the t th iteration. The constrained optimization problem of the generative decorrelator can be approximated by a series of unconstrained optimization problems with the loss function
where ρ t is a penalty coefficient increases with the number of iterations t. The algorithm and the penalty method are detailed in Appendix C.
GAP for Gaussian Mixture Models
In this section, we focus on a setting where S ∈ {0, 1} and X is an m-dimensional Gaussian mixture random vector whose mean is dependent on S. Let P (S = 1) = q. Let X|S = 0 ∼ N (−µ, Σ) and X|S = 1 ∼ N (µ, Σ), where µ = (µ 1 , ..., µ m ), and without loss of generality, we assume that X|S = 0 and X|S = 1 have the same covariance Σ.
We consider a MAP adversary who has access to P (X, S) and the censoring mechanism. The privatizer's goal is to privatize X in a way that minimizes the adversary's probability of correctly inferring S fromX. In order to have a tractable model for the privatizer, we mainly focus on linear (precisely affine) GAP mechanismsX = g(X) = X + Z + β, where Z is an independently generated noise vector. This linear GAP mechanism enables controlling both the mean and covariance of the privatized data. To quantify utility of the privatized data, we use the 2 distance between X and X as a distortion measure to obtain a distortion constraint E X,X X −X 2 ≤ D.
Game-Theoretical Approach
Consider the setup where both the privatizer and the adversary have access to P (X, S). Further, let Z be a zero-mean multi-dimensional Gaussian random vector. Although other distributions can be considered, we choose additive Gaussian noise for tractability reasons.
Without loss of generality, we assume that β = (β 1 , ..., β m ) is a constant parameter vector and Z ∼ N (0, Σ p ). Following similar analysis in Gallager [2013] , we can show that the adversary's probability of detection is given by
To make the problem more tractable, we assume both X and Z are independent multi-dimensional Gaussian random vectors with diagonal covariance matrices.
Theorem 5 Consider GAP mechanisms given by g(X) = X + Z + β, where X|S and Z are multidimensional Gaussian random vectors with diagonal covariance matrices Σ and Σ p . Let {σ 2 1 , ..., σ 2 m } and {σ 2 p 1 , ..., σ 2 pm } be the diagonal entries of Σ and Σ p , respectively. The parameters of the minimax optimal censoring mechanism are
For this optimal mechanism, the accuracy of the MAP adversary is given by (8) 
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix C.1. We observe that the when σ 2 i is greater than some threshold |µ i | √ λ * 0 , no noise is added to the data on this dimension due to the high variance.
When σ 2 i is smaller than |µ i | √ λ * 0 , the amount of noise added to this dimension is proportional to |µ i |;
this is intuitive since a large |µ i | indicates the two conditionally Gaussian distributions are further away on this dimension, and thus, distinguishable. Thus, more noise needs to be added in order to reduce the MAP adversary's inference accuracy.
Data-driven Approach
For the data-driven linear GAP mechanism, we assume the privatizer only has access to the dataset D with n data samples but not the actual distribution of (X, S). Computing the optimal censoring mechanism becomes a learning problem. In the training phase, the data holder learns the parameters of the GAP mechanism by competing against a computational adversary modeled by a multilayer neural network. When convergence is reached, we evaluate the performance of the learned mechanism by comparing with the one obtained from the game-theoretic approach. To quantify the performance of the learned GAP mechanism, we compute the accuracy of inferring S under a strong MAP adversary that has access to both the joint distribution of (X, S) and the censoring mechanism.
Since the sensitive variable S is binary, we measure the training loss of the adversary network by the empirical log-loss function
For a fixed privatizer parameter θ p , the adversary learns the optimal θ * a by maximizing (9). For a fixed θ a , the privatizer learns the optimal θ * p by minimizing −L n (h(g(X; θ p ); θ a ), S) subject to the distortion constraint E X,X X −X 2 ≤ D.
As shown in Figure 3 , the privatizer is modeled by a two-layer neural network with parameters θ p = {β 0 , ..., β m , σ p0 , ..., σ pm }, where β k and σ pk represent the mean and standard deviation for each dimension k ∈ {1, ..., m}, respectively. The random noise Z is drawn from a m-dimensional independent zero-mean standard Gaussian distribution with covariance Σ 1 . Thus, we haveX k = X k + β k + σ pk Z k . The adversary, whose goal is to infer S from privatized dataX, is modeled by a three-layer neural network classifier with leaky ReLU activations.
To incorporate the distortion constraint into the learning process, we add a penalty term to the objective of the privatizer. Thus, the training loss function of the privatizer is given by
(X, S)Ŝ censoring/Fair Encoder Adversary where ρ is a penalty coefficient which increases with the number of iterations. The added penalty consists of a penalty parameter ρ multiplied by a measure of violation of the constraint. This measure of violation is non-zero when the constraint is violated. Otherwise, it is zero.
Illustration of Results
We use synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance of the learned GAP mechanisms. Each dataset contains 20K training samples and 2K test samples. Each data entry is sampled from an independent multi-dimensional Gaussian mixture model. We consider two categories of synthetic datasets with P (S = 1) equal to 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. Both the privatizer and the adversary in the GAP framework are trained on Tensorflow using Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.005 and a minibatch size of 1000. The distortion constraint is enforced by the penalty method as detailed in supplement B (see (18)). Figure 4 illustrates the performance of the learned GAP scheme against a strong theoretical MAP adversary for a 32-dimensional Gaussian mixture model with P (S = 1) = 0.75 and 0.5. We observe that the inference accuracy of the MAP adversary decreases as the distortion increases and asymptotically approaches (as expected) the prior on the sensitive variable. The decorrelation scheme obtained via the data-driven approach performs very well when pitted against the MAP adversary (maximum accuracy difference around 0.7% compared to the theoretical optimal). Furthermore, the estimated mutual information decreases as the distortion increases. In other words, for the data generated by Gaussian mixture model with binary sensitive variable, the data-driven version of GAP can learn decorrelation schemes that perform as well as the decorrelation schemes computed under the theoretical version of GAP, given that the generative decorrelator has access to the statistics of the dataset.
GAP for Real Datasets
We apply our GAP framework to real-world datasets to demonstrate its effectiveness. The GENKI dataset consists of 1, 740 training and 200 test samples. Each data sample is a 16 × 16 greyscale face image with varying facial expressions. Both training and test datasets contain 50% male and 50% female. Among each gender, we have 50% smile and 50% non-smile faces. We consider gender as sensitive variable S and the image pixels as public variable X. The HAR dataset consists of 561 features of motion sensor data collected by a smartphone from 30 subjects performing six activities (walking, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, sitting, standing, laying). We choose subject identity as sensitive variable S and features of motion sensor data as public variable X. The dataset is (a) Sensitive variable classification accuracy (b) Estimated mutual information between S and X Figure 4 : Performance of GAP for Gaussian mixture models randomly partitioned into 8, 000 training and 2, 299 test samples. The COMPAS dataset includes COMPAS risk scores, recidivism records, race, gender, and other relevant attributes. We consider race as the sensitive variable S and age category, juvenile felony count, juvenile misdemeanor count, prior count, charge degree, and charge description to be the public variable. The dataset is partitioned into 6, 000 training and 1, 215 test samples. We train our models based on the data-driven GAP presented in Section 3 using TensorFlow .
Generative Decorrelator and Adversary Model
For the GENKI dataset, we consider two different decorrelator architectures: the feedforward neural network decorrelator (FNND) and the transposed convolution neural network decorrelator (TC-NND). The FNND architecture uses a feedforward multi-layer neural network to combine the lowdimensional random noise (100×1) and the original image together ( Figure 5) . The TCNND takes a low-dimensional random noise and generates high-dimensional noise using a multi-layer transposed convolution neural network. The generated high-dimensional noise is added to each pixel of the original image to produce the processed image ( Figure 6 ). For the HAR dataset, we use the FNND architecture modeled by multi-layer feedforward neural networks.
GAP Architectures for Different Datasets
The FNND is modeled by a four-layer feedforward neural network. We first reshape each image to a vector (256 × 1), and then concatenate it with a 100 × 1 Gaussian random noise vector. Each entry in the noise vector is sampled independently from a standard Gaussian distribution. We feed the entire vector to a four-layer fully connected (FC) neural network. Each layer has 256 neurons with a leaky ReLU activation function. Finally, we reshape the output of the last layer to a 16 × 16 image. To model the TCNND, we first generate a 100 × 1 Gaussian random vector and use a linear projection to map the noise vector to a 4 × 4 × 256 feature tensor. The feature tensor is then fed to an initial transposed convolution layer (DeCONV) with 128 filters (filter size 3 × 3, stride 2) and a ReLU activation, followed by another DeCONV layer with 1 filter (filter size 3 × 3, stride 2) and a tanh activation. The output of the DeCONV layer is added to the original image to generate the processed data. For both decorrelators, we add batch normalization Ioffe and Szegedy [2015] on each hidden layer to prevent covariance shift and help gradients to flow. We model the adversary using convolutional neural networks (CNNs). This architecture outperforms most of other models for image classification Krizhevsky et al. [2012] , . Figure 7 illustrates the architecture of the adversary. The processed images are fed to two convolution layers (CONV) whose sizes are 3 × 3 × 32 and 3 × 3 × 64, respectively. Each convolution layer is followed by ReLU activation and batch normalization. The output of each convolution layer is fed to a 2 × 2 maxpool layer (POOL) to extract features for classification. The second maxpool layer is followed by two fully connected layers, each contains 1024 neurons with a batch normalization and a ReLU activation. Finally, the output of the last fully connected layer is mapped to the output layer, which contains two neurons capturing the belief of the subject being a male or a female.
For the HAR dataset, We first concatenate the original data with a 100 × 1 Gaussian random noise vector. We then feed the entire 661 × 1 vector to a Feed Forward neural network with three hidden fully connected (FC) layers. Each hidden layer has 512 neurons with a leaky ReLU activation. Finally, we use another FC layer with 561 neurons to generate the processed data. For the adversary, we use a five-layer feedforward neural network. The hidden layers have 512, 512, 256, and 128 neurons with leaky ReLU activation, respectively. The output of the last hidden layer is mapped to the output layer, which contains 30 neurons capturing the belief of the subject's identity. For both decorrelator and adversary, we add a batch normalization after the output of each hidden layer.
Since the COMPAS dataset consists of categorical data, we first perform the onehot encoding on the data and store the mapping function from the onehot encoding to the categorical data. Then, we concatenate the encoded data with a 100 × 1 standard Gaussian random noise vector. We feed the entire vector to a feedforward neural network with two hidden FC layers. Each hidden layer has 256 neurons with a leaky ReLU activation. We feed the output of the last hidden layer to another FC layer to generate a real-valued feature vector. For each feature vector, we select the highest values within onehot encoding index range corresponding to each attribute of the original data to generate the processed onehot encoding. Finally, we use the stored mapping function to map the processed onehot encoding to categorical data. For the adversary, we use a two-layer feedforward neural network. Each hidden layer has 256 neurons with leaky ReLU activation. We first onehot encode the data and feed the encoded data to the adversary neural network. The output of the last hidden layer is mapped to the output layer, which captures the belief of the subject's race. We also add batch normalization after the output of each hidden layer.
Illustration of Results
The GENKI Dataset. Figure 8a illustrates the gender classification accuracy of the adversary for different values of distortion. It can be seen that the adversary's accuracy of classifying the sensitive variable (gender) decreases progressively as the distortion increases. Given the same distortion value, FNND achieves lower gender classification accuracy compared to TCNND. An intuitive explanation is that the FNND uses both the noise vector and the original image to generate the processed image. However, the TCNND generates the noise mask that is independent of the original image pixels and adds the noise mask to the original image in the final step. Differential censoring has emerged as the gold standard for data censoring. In this experiment, we vary the variance of the Laplace and Gaussian noise to connect the noise adding mechanisms to local differential censoring Duchi et al. [2013] , Kairouz et al. [2016] . In particular, we compute the differential censoring guarantees provided by independent Laplace and Gaussian noise adding mechanisms for different distortion values. The details are provided in Appendix E. In Table 2 , we observe that even if a huge amount of noise is added to each pixel of the image, the censoring risk ( ) is still high. Furthermore, adding a huge noise deteriorates the expression classification accuracy.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the learned GAP schemes, we compare the gender classification accuracy of the learned GAP schemes with adding uniform or Laplace noise. Figure 8a shows Table 4 : Error rates for expression classification using representation learned by TCNND that for the same distortion, the learned GAP schemes achieve much lower gender classification accuracies than using uniform or Laplace noise. Furthermore, the estimated mutual information I(X; S) normalized byÎ(X; S) also decreases as the distortion increases (Figure 8b) . To evaluate the influence of GAP on other non-sensitive variable (Y ) classification tasks, we train another CNN (see Figure 7) to perform facial expression classification on datasets processed by different decorrelation schemes. The trained model is then tested on the original test data. In Figure 8a , we observe that the expression classification accuracy decreases gradually as the distortion increases. Even for a large distortion value (5 per image), the expression classification accuracy only decreases by 10%. Furthermore, the estimated normalized mutual informationÎ(X; Y )/Î(X; Y ) decreases much slower thanÎ(X; S)/Î(X; S) as the distortion increases (Figure 8b) . Table 3 and 4 present different error rates for the facial expression classifiers trained using data representations created by different decorrelator architectures. We observe that as distortion increases, the error rates difference for different sensitive groups decrease. This implies the classifier's decision is less biased to the sensitive variables when trained using the processed data. When D = 5, the differences are already very small. Furthermore, we notice that the FNND architecture performs better in enforcing fairness but suffers from higher error rate. The images processed by FNND is shown in Figure 9 . The decorrelator changes mostly eyes, nose, mouth, beard, and hair.
The HAR Dataset. Figure 10a illustrates the activity and identity classification accuracy for different values of distortion. The adversary's sensitive variable (identity) classification accuracy decreases progressively as the distortion increases. When the distortion is small (D = 2), the adversary's classification accuracy is already around 27%. If we increase the distortion to 8, the classification accuracy further decreases to 3.8%. Figure 10a depicts that even for a large distortion value (D = 8), the activity classification accuracy only decreases by 18% at most. Furthermore, Figure 9 : Perturbed images with different per pixel distortion using FNND Figure 10b shows that the estimated normalized mutual information also decreases as the distortion increases.
(a) Identity vs. activity classification accuracy (b) Normalized mutual information estimation Figure 10 : censoring/fairness-utility tradeoff and mutual information estimation for HAR
Conclusion
We have introduced a novel adversarial learning framework for creating private/fair representations of the data with verifiable guarantees. GAPF allows the data holder to learn the decorrelation scheme directly from the dataset (to be published) without requiring access to dataset statistics. Under GAPF, finding the optimal decorrelation scheme is formulated as a game between two players: a generative decorrelator and an adversary. We have shown that for appropriately chosen loss functions, GAPF can provide guarantees against strong information-theoretic adversaries, such as MAP and MI adversaries. It can also enforce fairness, quantified via demographic parity by using the log-loss function. We have also validated the performance of GAPF on Gaussian mixture models and real datasets. There are several fundamental questions that we seek to address. An immediate one is to develop techniques to rigorously benchmark data-driven results for large datasets against computable theoretical guarantees. More broadly, it will be interesting to investigate the robustness and convergence speed of the decorrelation schemes learned in a data-driven fashion. In this paper, we connect our objective function in GAPF with demographic parity. Since there is no single metric for fairness, this leaves room for designing objective functions that link to other fairness metrics such as equalized odds and equal opportunity.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
An encoder g(X) that satisfies demographic parity ensures that X r is independent of S, i.e., the mutual information I(S; X r ) = 0. Further, the downstream learning algorithm acts only on X r to predictŶ ; combining these, we have that, (S, X) − X r −Ŷ form a Markov chain. From Definition 3, since X r is independent of S, I(S; X r ) = 0. From the data processing inequality and non-negativity of mutual information, we have that, 0 ≤ I(S;Ŷ ) ≤ I(S; X r ) = 0.
Therefore, S is independent ofŶ , and thus, from Definition 1,Ŷ satisfies demographic parity w.r.t.
S.
Note that S can be collection of sensitive features. From the fact I(S; X r ) = 0 as well as the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information, we have I(X r ; S t ) = 0 for any subset of features S t ⊂ S. Therefore,Ŷ satisfies demographic parity w.r.t. any subset of features in S.
B Theoretical Results of GAP
Our GAP framework places no restrictions on the adversary. Indeed, different loss functions and decision rules lead to different adversarial models. In what follows, we will discuss a variety of loss functions under hard and soft decision rules, and show how our GAP framework can recover several popular information theoretic censoring notions. We will also show that we can obtain a continuous interpolation between a hard-decision adversary under 0-1 loss function and a soft-decision adversary under log-loss function using the α-loss function.
Hard Decision Rules.
When the adversary adopts a hard decision rule, h(g(X)) is an estimate of S. Under this setting, we can choose (h(g(X)), S) in a variety of ways. For instance, if S is continuous, the adversary can attempt to minimize the difference between the estimated and true sensitive variable values. This can be achieved by considering a squared loss function
which is known as the 2 loss. In this case, one can verify that the adversary's optimal decision rule is h * = E[S|g(X)], which is the conditional mean of S given g(X). Furthermore, under the adversary's optimal decision rule, the minimax problem in (6) simplifies to min g(·)
−mmse(S|g(X)) = − max g(·)
mmse(S|g(X)), subject to the distortion constraint. Here mmse(S|g(X)) is the resulting minimum mean square error (MMSE) under h * = E[S|g(X)]. Thus, under the 2 loss, GAP provides censoring guarantees against an MMSE adversary. On the other hand, when S is discrete (e.g., age, gender, political affiliation, etc), the adversary can attempt to maximize its classification accuracy. This is achieved by considering a 0-1 loss function Nguyen and Sanner [2013] given by
In this case, one can verify that the adversary's optimal decision rule is the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) decision rule: h * = argmax s∈S P (s|g(X)), with ties broken uniformly at random. Moreover, under the MAP decision rule, the minimax problem in (6) reduces to min g(·)
−(1 − max s∈S P (s, g(X))) = min
subject to the distortion constraint. Thus, under a 0-1 loss function, the GAP formulation provides censoring guarantees against a MAP adversary. Soft Decision Rules. Instead of a hard decision rule, we can also consider a broader class of soft decision rules where h(g(X)) is a distribution over S; i.e., h(g(X)) = P h (s|g(X)) for s ∈ S. In this context, we can analyze the performance under a log-loss (h(g(X)), s) = log 1 P h (s|g(X))
.
In this case, the objective of the adversary simplifies to
and that the maximization is attained at P * h (s|g(X)) = P (s|g(X)). Therefore, the optimal adversarial decision rule is determined by the true conditional distribution P (s|g(X)), which we assume is known to the data holder in the game-theoretic setting. Thus, under the log-loss function, the minimax optimization problem in (6) reduces to min g(·)
−H(S|g(X)) = min g(·) I(g(X); S) − H(S), subject to the distortion constraint. Thus, under the log-loss in (15), GAP is equivalent to using MI as the censoring metric Calmon and Fawaz [2012] .
The 0-1 loss captures a strong guessing adversary; in contrast, log-loss or information-loss models a belief refining adversary.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the α-loss function ?
for any α > 1. Denoting H a α (S|g(X)) as the Arimoto conditional entropy of order α, one can verify that
which is achieved by a 'α-tilted' conditional distribution P * h (s|g(X)) = P (s|g(X)) α s∈S P (s|g(X)) α .
Under this choice of a decision rule, the objective of the minimax optimization in (6) reduces to min g(·)
−H a α (S|g(X)) = min g(·)
where I a α is the Arimoto mutual information and H α is the Rényi entropy.
B.2 Proof of Corollary 1
For large α (α → ∞), this loss approaches that of the 0-1 (MAP) adversary in the limit. As α decreases, the convexity of the loss function encourages the estimatorŜ to be probabilistic, as it increasingly rewards correct inferences of lesser and lesser likely outcomes (in contrast to a hard decision rule by a MAP adversary of the most likely outcome) conditioned on the revealed data. As α → 1, (16) yields the logarithmic loss, and the optimal belief PŜ is simply the posterior belief. Therefore, using α-loss, we can obtain a continuous interpolation between a hard-decision adversary under 0-1 loss (α → ∞) and a soft-decision adversary under log-loss function (α → 1).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let's consider an arbitrary target variable Y which a user is interested in learning from the data. The objective of the learning task is to train a good model that takesX to predict Y . Thus, we have the Markov chain: S → X →X →Ŷ , whereŶ is an estimate of Y from the trained machine learning model. According to data processing inequality, we have I(S;X) ≥ I(S;Ŷ ). As we have shown in the above analysis, for the log-loss function, the objective of GAP is equivalent to minimizing I(S;X) , which is an upperbound on I(S;Ŷ ). Notice that demographic parity requires S andŶ to be independent, which is equivalent to I(S;Ŷ ) = 0. Since mutual information is nonnegative, GAP ensures fairness by minimizing an upperbound of I(S;Ŷ ) subject to the distortion constraint under the log-loss function. As the distortion increases, the ensuing fairness guarantee approaches ideal demographic parity by enforcing I(S;Ŷ ) ≤ I(S;X) = 0.
C Alternate Minimax Algorithm
In this section, we present the alternate minimax algorithm to learn the GAP scheme from a dataset. The alternating minimax censoring preserving algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
Perform line search along ∇ θ t p l(θ t p , θ t+1 a ) and update
Exit if solution converged return θ t+1 p To incorporate the distortion constraint into the learning algorithm, we use the penalty method Lillo et al. [1993] and augmented Lagrangian method Eckstein and Yao [2012] to replace the constrained optimization problem by a series of unconstrained problems whose solutions asymptotically converge to the solution of the constrained problem. Under the penalty method, the unconstrained optimization problem is formed by adding a penalty to the objective function. The added penalty consists of a penalty parameter ρ t multiplied by a measure of violation of the constraint. The measure of violation is non-zero when the constraint is violated and is zero if the constraint is not violated. Therefore, in Algorithm 1, the constrained optimization problem of the decorrelator can be approximated by a series of unconstrained optimization problems with the loss function Define 1−= η. The gradient of P (G) d w.r.t. α is given by
Note that
Therefore, the second term in (22) is 0. Furthermore, the first term in (22) is always positive. Thus, P
is monotonically increasing in α. As a result, the optimization problem in (20) is equivalent to
The objective function in (24) can be written as
Thus, the optimization problem in (24) is equivalent to
Since a non-zero β does not affect the objective function but result in positive distortion, the optimal scheme satisfies β = (0, ..., 0). Furthermore, the Lagrangian of the above optimization problem is given by
where λ = {λ 0 , ..., λ m } denotes the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints. Taking the derivatives of L(σ 2 p 1 , ..., σ 2 pm , λ) with respect to σ 2 p i , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}, we have ∂L(σ 2 p 1 , ..., σ 2 pm , λ) ∂σ 2
Notice that the objective function in (24) is decreasing in σ 2 p i , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}. Thus, the optimal solution σ *
By the KKT conditions, we have
Since λ * i , i ∈ {0, 1, ..., m} is dual feasible, we have λ * i ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., m}. Therefore 
Therefore, σ *
Substitute this optimal solution into (8) with α = (2µ) T (Σ + Σ p ) −1 2µ, we obtain the accuracy of the MAP adversary. We observe that the when σ 2 i is greater than some threshold |µ i | √ λ * 0 , no noise is added to the data on this dimension due to the high variance. When σ 2 i is smaller than |µ i | √ λ * 0 , the amount of noise added to this dimension is proportional to |µ i |; this is intuitive since a large |µ i | indicates the two conditionally Gaussian distributions are further away on this dimension, and thus, distinguishable. Thus, more noise needs to be added in order to reduce the MAP adversary's inference accuracy.
D Mutual Information Estimation
Our GAP framework offers a scalable way to find a (local) equilibrium in the constrained min-max optimization, under certain attacks (e.g. attacks based on a neural network). Yet the privatized data, through our approach, should be immune to any general attacks and ultimately achieving the goal of decreasing the correlation between the privatized data and the sensitive labels. Therefore we use the estimated mutual information to certify that the sensitive data indeed is protected via our framework. We use the nearest k-th neighbor methodKraskov et al. [2004] to estimate the entropyĤ given byĤ
where r i is the distance of the i-th samplex i to its k-th nearest neighbor, ψ is the digamma function, c d = π d/2 Γ(1+d/2) in Euclidean norm, and N is the number of samples. Notice thatX is learned representation and S is the sensitive variable. Then, we calculate the mutual information usingÎ(X; S) =Ĥ(X) −Ĥ(X|S)
For a binary sensitive variable, we can simplify the empirical MI tô I(X; S) =Ĥ(X) − P (S = 1)Ĥ(X|S = 1) + P (S = 0)Ĥ(X|S = 0) ,
where P (S = 1) and P (S = 0) can be approximated by the empirical probability. One noteworthy difficulty is thatX usually lives in high dimensions (e.g. each image has 256 dimensions in GENKI dataset) which is almost impossible to calculate the empirical entropy based on raw data due to the sample complexity. Thus, we train a neural network that classifies the sensitive variable from the learned data representation to reduce the dimension of the data. We choose the layer before the softmax outputs (denoted byX f ) to be the feature embedding that has a much lower dimension than originalX and also captures the information about the sensitive variable. We useX f as a surrogate ofX for estimating the entropy. The resulting approximate MI isÎ
=Ĥ(X f ) − P (S = 1)Ĥ(X f |S = 1) + P (S = 0)Ĥ(X f |S = 0) .
Following the same manner, the MI between the learned representationX and the label Y is approximated byÎ(X f ; Y ), whereX f is the feature embedding that represents a privatized imagê X.
For the GENKI dataset, we construct a CNN initialized by two conv blocks, then followed by two fully connected (FC) layers, and lastly ended with two neurons having the softmax activations. In each conv block, we have a convolution layer consisting of filters with the size equals 3×3 and the stride equals 1, a 2 × 2 max-pooling layer with the stride equals 2, and a ReLU activation function. Those two conv blocks have 32 and 64 filters respectively. We flatten out the output of second conv block yielding a 256 dimension vector. The extracted features from the second conv layers is passed through the first FC layer with batch normalization and ReLU activation to get a 8-dimensional vector, followed with the second FC layer to output a 2 dimensional vector that applied with the softmax function. The aforementioned 8-dimensional vector is the feature embedding vectorX f in our empirical MI estimation.
Estimating mutual information for HAR dataset has a slightly different challenge, as the size of the alphabet for the sensitive label (i.e. identity) is 30. Thus, it requires at least 30 neurons prior to the output layer of the corresponding classification task. In fact we pose 128 neurons before the final softmax output layer in order to get a reasonably good classification accuracy. Using the 128-dimensional vector as our feature embedding to calculate mutual information is almost impossible due to the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, we apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA), shown in Figure 11 , and pick the first 12 components to circumvent this issue. The resulting 12-dimensional vector is considered to be an approximate feature embedding that encapsulates the major information of the processed data.
E Compute differential censoring risk for the Laplace and Gaussian noise adding mechanisms
In the local differential censoring setting, we consider the value of each pixel as the output of the query function. Since the pixel values of the GENKI dataset are normalized between 0 and 1, we can (a) Top 32 principal components out of the 561 features with different distortion D Figure 11 : PCA for processed data in HAR use the dimension of the image to bound the sensitivities for both Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism. For the Laplace mechanism, let X and X be two different image vectors. Since the value of X and X in each dimension is between 0 and 1, |X i − X i | <= 1 for the i th dimension. Thus, the L 1 sensitivity can be bounded by the dimension of the image d. Notice that the variance of the Laplace noise parameterized by λ is 2λ 2 . Since we are adding independent Laplace noise to each pixel, given the per image distortion D, we have
Similarly, for the Gaussian mechanism, we can bound the L 2 sensitivity by √ d. For a fixed δ, the censoring risk for adding Gaussian noise with variance σ 2 is given by = 2 √ d σ ln( 1.25 δ ).
Since we are adding Gaussian noise independently to each pixel, the variance of the per pixel noise in given by σ = D d . As a result, we have
